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Trial Practice and Procedure
by John O'Shea Sullivan*
Ashby L. Kent"
and Amanda E. Wilson**
The 2011 survey period yielded several noteworthy decisions relating
to federal trial practice and procedure in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, some of which addressed issues of first
impression.' This Article analyzes recent developments in the Eleventh
Circuit, including significant rulings regarding arbitration, removal,
subject matter jurisdiction, and civil procedure.
I. ARBITRATION
A. Whether Filing an Amended Complaint Can Revive a Defendant's
Right to Compel Arbitration,NotwithstandingIts Previous Waiver of
that Right
In Krinsk v. Sunrust Banks, Inc.,' the Eleventh Circuit held, as a
matter of first impression, that filing an amended complaint could revive
a defendant's right to compel arbitration, notwithstanding the defen-
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Eleventh Circuit Survey, 62 MERCER L. REV. 1217 (2011).
2. 654 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2011).
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dant's previous waiver of that right.' The dispute in Krinsk arose out
of a home-equity line of credit (HELOC) that the plaintiff/appellee Sara
Krinsk obtained from the defendant/appellant SunTrust Bank in
December 2006. Krinsk's HELOC contained an arbitration clause which
required the parties to resolve all disputes via binding arbitration." The
arbitration clause provided that a party's notice of election to arbitrate
"may be given after a lawsuit has been filed and/or in papers filed in the
lawsuit," and precluded resolution of claims by class action.'
In October 2008, SunTrust suspended Krinsk's access to her HELOC,
alleging concern over her ability to fulfill her payment obligations due
to a change in her financial circumstances.6 Krinsk alleged that
SunTrust's concern was pretextual and that SunTrust had suspended
her HELOC access, and that of other Florida homeowners, as part of a
scheme to restore its capital reserves.' Krinsk, who was ninety-two
years old, alleged that elderly HELOC borrowers were the most
vulnerable targets of SunTrust's scheme because SunTrust did not
anticipate much resistance.'
On May 15, 2009, Krinsk filed a class action complaint against
SunTrust in the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida. 9 The complaint defined the proposed class as follows:

3. Id. at 1196.
4. Id. at 1197.
5. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The arbitration clause in Krinsk's HELOC
agreement provided in pertinent part as follows:
5. NO CLASS ACTIONS, ETC.. . . if you or we elect to arbitrate a claim, neither
you nor we will have the right: (a) to participate in a class action in court or in
arbitration, either as a class representative, class member or class opponent; or
(b) to join or consolidate [claims with claims of any person other than you. No
arbitrator shall have authority to conduct any arbitration in violation of this
provision.
Id. at 1197 n.1.
6. Id. at 1197. Prior to suspending her HELOC access, SunTrust had mailed Krinsk
a letter requesting updated financial information from her. SunTrust contended that
Krinsk's HELOC access was suspended due to the information that Krinsk provided in
response to that request. Id.
7. Id.
According to Krinsk, HELOCs like hers-those sold to Florida residents between
the late 1990s and early 2008 and secured by Florida real property-were among
the highest-rated risk elements in SunTrust's debt portfolio, and SunTrust,
recognizing that it had a significant concentration of credit risk arising from these
loans, aimed to systematically liquidate the loans' available credit balances.
Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1197-98. In her original complaint, Krinsk sought declaratory relief regarding
her right to access her HELOC and asserted claims for financial elder abuse under
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[Alll Florida permanent or part-time residents that entered into an
agreement with SunTrust entitled "Access 3 Equity Line Account
Agreement and Disclosure" and who, after attaining the age of sixtyfive (65), received a letter from SunTrust between July 1, 2008 and
October 16, 2008, requesting updated financial information ... and
who were subsequently informed their collateralized credit line had
been suspended or reduced during the draw period for purportedly
failing to provide the information requested by SunTrust."
Krinsk estimated in her motion for class certification that this class
would "consist[] of hundreds of members located throughout Florida.""
SunTrust filed a motion to dismiss, but did not seek to compel
arbitration or otherwise mention the HELOC's arbitration clause. The
litigation proceeded while SunTrust's motion was pending, during which
time the parties filed a case management report wherein they submitted
a proposed discovery and pretrial plan, and SunTrust stated that it
opposed arbitrating Krinsk's claims. SunTrust also defended against
Krinsk's motion for class certification and class discovery. SunTrust
never asserted its right to compel arbitration and never otherwise
indicated its intent to do so.' 2
On January 8, 2010, the district court granted SunTrust's motion in
part but allowed Krinsk leave to amend the complaint." On January
28, Krinsk filed an amended complaint which offered a new definition of
the proposed class as follows:
All Florida residents who entered into one or more agreements for a
... [HELOCI with SunTrust Bank pursuant to its "Access 3 Equity
Line Account Agreement and Disclosure" that was collateralized by real
estate located in Florida, and who had the available balance of their
HELOC suspended or reduced anytime between January 1, 2007 to the
date of class certification (the "Class Period").' 4
The amended complaint and definition encompassed all Florida
residents, regardless of age, who had their HELOCs suspended for any

Florida's Adult Protective Services Act, breach of contract, deceit, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, violation of the Truth in Lending Act and its corresponding
Regulation Z, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Krinsk
also named SunTrust's corporate parent and President/CEO as defendants, although her
claims against these defendants were later dismissed. Id. at 1198-99.
10. Id. at 1198.
11. Id. (alteration in original) (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1198-99.
14. Id. at 1199. The district court had not yet ruled on Krinsk's motion for class
certification at the time she filed her amended complaint. Id.
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reason during a three-year period, which had the potential to greatly
enlarge the size of the putative class. Krinsk estimated in her amended
motion for class certification that the number of class members would be
in the thousands, if not the tens of thousands."5
In its answer to the amended complaint, and for the first time since
litigation began, SunTrust raised its right to arbitrate. SunTrust also
filed a motion to compel arbitration, a motion to stay the action pending
arbitration, and a motion to prohibit maintenance of a class action
pursuant to the HELOC's arbitration clause. Krinsk opposed SunTrust's
motions, claiming that SunTrust had waived its right to compel
arbitration. 6
The district court denied SunTrust's motion to compel arbitration,
finding that Krinsk had met both prongs of a two-part test designed to
determine whether SunTrust had waived its contractual right to
arbitrate." First, the court found that SunTrust had acted inconsistently with its right to arbitrate by permitting nearly nine months to
pass and participating in the litigation up until the filing of the amended
complaint.'" Second, the court concluded that "Krinsk would suffer
prejudice were SunTrust permitted to assert its arbitration rights in
such an untimely manner," because she had been induced to spend time
and money on class-related motion practice and discovery-"the type of
litigation expense[s] that arbitration was designed to alleviate"-due to
her belief that SunTrust would not pursue arbitration under the
contract.' 9 SunTrust appealed, arguing that even if its right to

15. Id.
16. Id. at 1199-1200.
17. Id. at 1200.
To determine whether a party has waived its contractual right to arbitrate, courts
apply a two-part test: "First, [they] decide if, under the totality of the circumstances, the party has acted inconsistently with the arbitration right, and, second,
[they] look to see whether, by doing so, that party has in some way prejudiced the
other party."
Id. (quoting Ivax Corp. v. B. Braun of Am., Inc., 286 F.3d 1309, 1315 (11th Cir. 2002)).
18. Id. at 1201. Specifically, "the district court concluded that SunTrust had, for nine
months prior to filing its answer and motion to compel arbitration, 'invoked the judicial
process in litigating this case without any indication that it was contemplating arbitration.'" Id. The district court also focused on SunTrust's express opposition to arbitration
in its case management report, in addition to the significant motions practice that
SunTrust had employed in opposition to Krinsk's request for class certification and class
discovery following the filing of the original complaint. Id. The district court determined
that "[tihese actions . . . displayed SunTrust's consent to the case's proceeding in court"
rather than arbitration. Id.
19. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court
further found that Krinsk's filing of the amended complaint was "'immaterial' to its
assessment, since the claims she raised in both complaints were 'based on the same
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arbitrate was waived from previous defense through the judicial process,
filing the amended complaint "'rejuvenated' or revived its right to compel
arbitration."2 0
Noting that this was an issue of first impression for the court, the
Eleventh Circuit looked to the decisions of other federal courts that had
considered this issue and found that, "in limited circumstances, fairness
dictates that a waiver of arbitration be nullified by the filing of an
amended complaint."2 1 Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit held that a
defendant's prior waiver of its right to compel arbitration should not be
nullified because the right to arbitrate cannot be effectively revived if
the amended complaint does not unexpectedly expand the scope of the
litigation.2 2 The Eleventh Circuit noted that courts refused to revive
the right to compel arbitration where the amended complaint made only
minor factual changes which did not alter the underlying scope or theory
of substantive claims.23
Unlike those cases, the Eleventh Circuit determined that in the case
at bar, the amended complaint greatly broadened the potential scope of
the litigation by amending the class definition to potentially include
thousands of new class plaintiffs who were not contemplated in the
original class definition.
The court held that "[tihis vast augmentation of the putative class so altered the shape of litigation that, despite
its prior invocations of the judicial process, SunTrust should have been
allowed to rescind its waiver of its right to arbitration. 2 5 The court
further held that
SunTrust's acts in furtherance of the litigation all occurred prior to the
filing of the [almended [clomplaint and thus concerned the class
contemplated in the [olriginal [clomplaint; SunTrust proceeded in court
on the expectation that, if the class action were certified, it would
defend itself against only the relatively small plaintiff class defined in
the foiriginal [ciomplaint. SunTrust could not have foreseen that
Krinsk would expand the putative class in such a broad way nine
months into the litigation. Given this unforeseen alteration in the
shape of the case, SunTrust, in plain fairness, should have been

operative facts,' i.e., SunTrust's allegedly improper scheme to suspend HELOCs secured
by Florida real property." Id.
20. Id. at 1202.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1203.
23. Id.
24. Id. Specifically, the court noted that "the old definition's limits on the class
plaintiffs' age and on the bases for their HELOC suspensions" had been discarded, and that
the class period had been expanded from over three months to over three years. Id.
25. Id. at 1204.
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allowed to rescind its earlier waiver through its prompt motion to
compel arbitration.26
Upon holding that SunTrust's right to compel arbitration, even if waived
with respect to the claims in the original complaint, was revived by
Krinsk's filing of the amended complaint, the Eleventh Circuit vacated
the district court's order denying SunTrust's motion to compel arbitration."
B. Whether ArbitratorsExceeded Their Authority, Thereby Justifying
Vacatur of Their Award, By Purportedly Failingto Provide a
"Reasoned Award" as Agreed to by the Parties
In Cat Charter, LLC v. Schurtenberger," the Eleventh Circuit
addressed the question of whether arbitrators exceeded the scope of their
authority, thereby justifying vacatur of their award under 9 U.S.C.
§ 10(aX4) of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)," when the arbitrators
allegedly failed to provide a "reasoned award" as agreed to in an
The dispute in Cat Charter began after
arbitration agreement."
plaintiffs paid the defendants to construct a yacht, but defendants never
delivered the vessel. Pursuant to an arbitration clause in their
construction contract, plaintiffs initiated an arbitration proceeding with
the American Arbitration Association (AAA)." The defendants filed an
answer denying all of the plaintiffs' allegations, and both parties
requested an award of reasonable attorney fees.32
The arbitration proceeded under the AAA's Commercial Arbitration
Rules before a panel of three arbitrators." In its preliminary schedul-

26. Id. The court further noted the following:
[t]he only action that SunTrust took after the Amended Complaint was filed was
to submit its answer and its motion to compel arbitration thirteen days later.
Thus, in no way did SunTrust act in a manner inconsistent with its right to elect
arbitration following the filing of the Amended Complaint.
Id. at 1204 n.22.
27. Id. at 1204.
28. 646 F.3d 836 (11th Cir. 2011).
29. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2006).
30. Cat Charter,646 F.3d at 839.
31. Id. The plaintiffs asserted claims against the defendants for deceptive and unfair
trade practices under Florida law, rescission, breach of contract, fraud or alternative
misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and civil remedies for criminal practices under
Florida law. Id.
32. Id. at 839-40.
33. Id. at 840. The court noted that
[plarties may contract for more than the default "standard award" in arbitration.
Under Arbitration Rule R 42(b), "[tlhe arbitrator need not render a reasoned
award unless the parties request such an award in writing prior to the appoint-
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ing order, the panel stated that the form of the award "will be determined by agreement of the parties."" Following discovery, a hearing,
and post-trial briefing, the panel issued a unanimous arbitration award,
finding that the plaintiffs had proven some of their claims "by the
greater weight of the evidence;" that all other claims and counterclaims
were denied; and finding as follows on the claims for attorney fees:
4. On the claim of the [plaintiffs] for entitlement to attorney[s] fees in
this arbitration proceeding and entitlement to an award of arbitration
expenses and costs, inclusive of the arbitrators' fees and costs, we find
that [plaintiffs] are the substantially prevailing parties in this arbitration and are entitled to an award of such fees and costs against
[defendants]....
5. On the claim of the [defendants] for entitlement to attorney['s] fees
and costs in this arbitration, we find that [defendants] are not the
substantially prevailing parties in this arbitration, and said claim is
denied;
6. On the claim by [plaintiffs] for civil theft which the [a]rbitrators
have denied, the [a]rbitrators find that [plaintiffs] raised a claim that
had substantial fact and legal support pursuant to [Florida law] ...
justifying denial of any attorney['s] fees for [defendants]."
The plaintiffs filed a motion to confirm the award in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida." The defendants
moved to vacate the award, alleging the panel exceeded its authority by
failing to issue a "reasoned award" as required by the parties' agreement." The defendants argued that "the [p]anel's statements that the

ment of the arbitrator,or unless the arbitrator determines that a reasoned award
is appropriate."
Id. at 840 n.6 (second alteration in original).
34. Id. at 840 (internal quotation marks omitted). The defendants' counsel sent a fax
to the AAA case manager to inform her that "the parties have agreed that the panel shall
provide a reasoned award and that the panel shall determine who the prevailing party or
parties are on the various claims between the parties." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). Similarly, in their post-trial brief, the plaintiffs stated that "[the parties have
agreed to ask the panel to issue a 'reasoned award' and determine which party is the
'prevailing party' on all claims." Id.
35. Id. at 841. The arbitration panel then ordered the defendants to pay the plaintiffs
more than $2 million in damages, fees, costs, and interest and also granted the plaintiffs
a first priority lien interest on the yacht. Id.
36. Id. In their motion to confirm the award, the plaintiffs did not note the parties'
agreement that required the arbitration panel to provide a reasoned award, nor did they
present an argument about the sufficiency of the reasons provided in the award. Id.
37. Id. The Eleventh Circuit noted that the defendants "never complained to the
[planel regarding the form of the [a]ward or requested a modification of the [aiward after
it was delivered; they first raised their concern over the lack of reasons provided by the

1338

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

[p]laintiffs proved their claims 'by the greater weight of the evidence'
add [ed] no explanatory value to the [alward and 'work[ed] no transformative alchemy on what [was] most certainly a 'bare' or 'standard'
award.'"" The district court agreed with defendants and vacated the
arbitration award, finding that the panel had exceeded its powers within
the meaning of § 10(a)(4) of the FAA because it failed to issue a
satisfactorily reasoned award. 9 The plaintiffs appealed.4 0
The Eleventh Circuit noted that § 10(a) of the FAA provides for
vacatur of an arbitration award if, by not providing a reasoned award,
"the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them
that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter
submitted was not made."4' Noting that "arbitration is a creature of
contract," the court recognized that arbitrators "may exceed their power
within the meaning of § 10(a)(4) if they fail to comply with mutually
agreed-upon contractual provisions in an agreement to arbitrate."
The court further noted that "[aln arbitrator may also exceed her

[planel in their motion to vacate." Id. The court further noted that the defendants had not
waived any claims through their delay in complaining about the form of the award, but
rather "note[d] that the [diefendants raised this claim for the first time upon seeking
vacatur only to underscore the apparently strategic nature of [the defendants'] behavior."
Id. at 841 n.8.
38. Id. at 844.
39. Id. at 842. The district court found that:
remand to the [planel was barred by the operation of the common law doctrine
functus officio . . .. In other words, the district court determined that the [alward
was so deficient that it warranted sending the parties back to square one,
ostensibly granting the [d]efendants a second bite at the apple because of a
perceived technical defect in the form of the [alward.
Id. The Eleventh Circuit held the following:
[blecause we ultimately reverse the district court's holding that the arbitrators
exceeded their powers, we need not reach the question of whether functus officio
would bar remand to the original arbitrators. Nevertheless, we note approvingly
that a sister circuit, when faced with a nearly identical factual scenario, deemed
the doctrine inapplicable and remand to the original arbitrators appropriate.
Id. at 842 n.9 (citing Green v. Ameritech Corp., 200 F.3d 967, 976-78 (6th Cir. 2000)).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 842 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). The
court also noted that § 10(a)(4) "is the most frequent ground upon which awards are
vacated." Cat Charter,646 F.3d at 843 n.12.
42. Cat Charter,643 F.3d at 843. To illustrate, the court noted Szutz v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 931 F.2d 830 (11th Cir. 1991), which vacated an arbitration award where
the award was handed down by two arbitrators when the arbitration agreement required
arbitration before at least three arbitrators. Cat Charter,646 F.3d at 843.
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authority by failing to provide an award in the form required by an
arbitration agreement."' Thus, the court held the following:
[tlo determine whether the [planel in this case exceeded its powers,
then, we must first decipher what constitutes a "reasoned award," a
somewhat ambiguous term left undefined by the FAA, the Arbitration
Rules, and the parties' contract. As a result, we must rely on common
sense and scarce precedent to illuminate this critical term."
The court first noted that arbitrations without requested awards may
warrant a "standard award" that simply announces the result of
arbitration.4 ' The court then held that, alternatively, parties may
request that "findings of fact and conclusions of law" be made under
standards complying with that of federal courts.4 ' Accordingly, the
court acknowledged that "a reasoned award is something short of
findings and conclusions but more than a simple result."
In looking for additional guidance to define this term, the court cited
Webster's Dictionary, which defines "reasoned" as "based on or marked
Thus, the court held that a "'reasoned' award is an
by reasoning."
award that is provided with or marked by the detailed listing or mention
of expressions or statements offered as a justification of an act-the 'act'
here being, of course, the decision of the [panel."
With these definitions in mind, the court in Cat Charterheld that the
arbitration award was appropriate under § 10(a)(4).so In support
thereof, the court reasoned that the award was primarily based upon
credibility of the parties as determined by the arbitration panel, and the
terms of the award made clear that the plaintiffs' witnesses were found
more credible." Although the court noted that the panel could have
provided more explanation of its findings, the court determined that the
panel provided more than a standard award and "had the parties wished
for a greater explanation, they could have requested that the [planel

43. Cat Charter, 646 F.3d at 843. The court briefly discussed, as an illustration,
Western Employers Insurance v. Jefferies & Co., 958 F.2d 258, 260 (9th Cir. 1992), when
the court vacated an arbitration award that failed to provide findings of fact and
conclusions of law as required by the arbitration agreement. Cat Charter,646 F.3d at 843.
44. Cat Charter,646 F.3d at 843.
45. Id. at 844.
46. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
47. Id. (quoting Sarofin v. Trust Co. of the W., 440 F.3d 213, 215 n.1 (5th Cir. 2006))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
48. Id.; WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY: UNABRIDGED 1892 (1993).
49. Cat Charter,645 F.3d at 844.
50. Id.

51. Id. at 844-45.
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The court stated
provide findings of fact and conclusions of law .... "
that the panel provided sufficient explanation for the only two findings
that required explanation-determination of prevailing party and award
of attorney fees." In sum, the court held that "the [a]ward was a
reasoned one" and that its holding "comports with the sparse precedent
that specifically addresses this issue,"5 and "holds consistent with the
general review principles embodied in the FAA."" Therefore, the
Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's order and remanded for
reinstatement of the arbitration award."
C. Whether a Contractual Class Action Waiver Within an Arbitration
Agreement is Enforceable, and Whether the Federal ArbitrationAct
Preempts a State Law Which Purportsto Invalidate Such a Waiver as
Contrary to Public Policy
In Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC," the Eleventh Circuit addressed
whether a contractual class action waiver in an arbitration agreement
was unenforceable on the ground that it allegedly violated Florida public
policy." The plaintiffs in Cruz were customers of AT&T Mobility, LLC
(ATTM), a cellular phone company. The plaintiffs each signed a contract
with ATTM, wherein each customer plaintiff agreed that any disputes
arising out of the cellular service would be resolved through binding

52. Id. at 845.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 845 & n.16. Compare Green v. Ameritech Corp., 200 F.3d 967, 970, 974-76
(6th Cir. 2000) (reversing a district court's vacatur order and confirming an arbitration
award challenged on the ground that it failed to provide reasons when the arbitration
agreement required an explanation with respect to each theory advanced), with Vold v.
Boin & Assocs. Inc., 699 N.W.2d 482, 484-85 (S.D. 2005)) (affirming a lower court's vacatur
order where an arbitrator provided "no reason for each award and no reason for rejecting
[a party's] claims" and "did not mention any of the relevant contract provisions at issue,
cite any law, or discuss any of the evidence" despite being required to provide a reasoned
award).
55. Cat Charter, 646 F.3d at 845. The court noted that the Supreme Court has
interpreted §§ 9-11 of the FAA:
as substantiating a national policy favoring arbitration with just the limited
review needed to maintain arbitration's essential virtue of resolving disputes
straightaway. Any other reading opens the door to the fill-bore legal and
evidentiary appeals that can render informal arbitration merely a prelude to a
more cumbersome and time-consuming judicial review process, and bring
arbitration theory to grief in post-arbitration process.
Cat Charter,646 F.3d at 845 (quoting Hall Street Assoc., LLC. v. Mattel Inc., 552 U.S. 576,
588 (2008)).
56. Cat Charter,646 F.3d at 846.
57. 648 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2011).
58. Id. at 1206.
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individual arbitration, rather than a class-wide resolution basis."
Notwithstanding this mandatory arbitration provision, the plaintiffs filed
a class action against ATTM in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida,"o alleging that ATTM violated the Florida
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA)e' by charging
them a fee of $2.99 a month for a Roadside Assistance Plan (RAP) that
the plaintiffs never agreed to or ordered.62 ATTM then moved to
dismiss the complaint and, pursuant to the arbitration agreement,
compel arbitration. The plaintiffs argued the arbitration provision could
not stand because a waiver of class actions would effectively immunize
ATTM from potential liability for unlawful business practices, thereby
hindering the remedial purposes of the FDUTPA and violating Florida
public policy."
The district court granted ATTM's motion to dismiss and compel
arbitration, finding that "an arbitration agreement is unenforceable for
public policy reasons if it defeats the remedial purpose of the statute
upon which the action is based, or deprives the plaintiff of the ability to
obtain meaningful relief."64 The district court further found that
"although FDUTPA claims are susceptible to class action litigation,
FDUTPA [did] not confer a blanket, non-waivable right to class
representation." 5 The district court then addressed the arbitration

59. Id.
60. Id. The complaint requested damages and injunctive relief, and sought certification
of a putative class consisting of"[a]ll persons and entities who (1) enrolled in a[n ATTM]
account in the state of Florida; and (2) were subjected to a monthly charge for the Roadside
Assistance Plan without ever requesting or enrolling in said plan." Id. at 1208.
61. FLA. STAT. §§ 501.201 to 501.213 (2012), availableat http://www.leg.state.fl.us/statutues/.
62. Cruz, 648 F.3d at 1207. The RAP purported to "provide customers with towing
services, dead-battery jump starts, flat-tire assistance, fuel delivery, lockout assistance, and
key replacement services. Although ATTM callled] the RAP 'optional,' the Plaintiffs
alleg[ed] that ATTM automatically enrolled customers for the service without the
customers' knowledge or consent." Id. at 1208.
63. Id. at 1208.
64. Id. (quoting Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, No. 2:07-CV-714-FTM-29DNF, 2008
WL 4279690, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 15, 2008)).
65. Id. In support of its holding, the district court noted that:
Florida['s] intermediate appellate courts [had] invalidated ... arbitration
agreements that purportled] to limit the substantive remedies available under
[the] FDUTPA [as against public policy] ... [but], [bly contrast,. . . [had] enforced
an arbitration agreement containing a class action waiver where the agreement
provided that the consumer retained all substantive rights and remedies granted
under FDUTPA, and did not eliminate the consumer's right to recover full
attorney's fees.
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agreement at issue in this case, concluding that it was valid and
enforceable because:
(1)there is no question that the arbitration agreement provides all the
same remedies available to plaintiffs under FDUTPA, as it states in
relevant part that "[alrbitrators can award the same damages and
relief that a court can award,"[;] (2) the agreement allows a consumer
who prevails in arbitration to recover attorney's] fees and costs from
ATTM without limitation, and even allows an award of double
attorney['s] fees in certain instances[;] (3)there was no confidentiality
rule preventing the Plaintiffs from disseminating information about
their claims to other potential claimants[;j and (4) ATTM agreed to
bear all costs of arbitration regardless of which party prevailed."
Based on these features, the district court concluded that the arbitration
agreement was valid and did not defeat the remedial purposes of the
FDUTPA.67
The plaintiffs appealed, "[alrguing that the district court failed to
appreciate the functionally exculpatory effect of the class action
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that it "must affirm
waiver.'
the district court's order compelling individual arbitration if either the
class action waiver is enforceable under Florida law or the FAA
preempts Florida law to the extent it would invalidate the waiver.""
In its analysis, the court relied heavily on the United States Supreme
Court's decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,"o which involved
a putative class action about the same arbitration clause at issue in
Cruz." In Concepcion, the Supreme Court held that a California "state
law which classif[ied] most collective-arbitration waivers in consumer
contracts as unconscionable, and thus unenforceable, was preempted by
the [FAA]"72

In Concepcion, the plaintiffs argued that the class action waiver in the
arbitration agreement was unconscionable and unenforceable under

Id. at 1208-09 (citing Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69938, at *23).
66. Id. at 1209 (citations omitted).
67. Id. at 1210.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
71. Cruz, 648 F.3d at 1210-11 (citing Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744).
72. Id. at 1207, 1211 (quoting Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746, 1753). The Supreme
Court rendered its decision in Concepcion after the Eleventh Circuit had heard oral
argument in Cruz. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit requested supplemental briefing from the
parties regarding the effect of Concepcion on the case at bar prior to rendering its decision
on appeal. Id. at 1207.
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California law because it operated to "exemptO ... [ATTMI from
responsibility for its own fraud."" The plaintiffs in Concepcion argued
that the "saving clause" found at § 2 of the FAA74 allowed for revocation of their arbitration agreements, especially since unconscionability
is grounds for revocation, whether at law or in equity." In Concepcion,
the Court did not dispute that the law, as held by the California
Supreme Court in Discover Bank v. Superior Court," would invalidate
the class action waiver as unconscionable based on a three-part test used
in Discover Bank:
(1) "the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion" drafted by
a party that has superior bargaining power; (2) "disputes between the
contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages"; and
(3) "it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has
carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers
out of individually small sums of money.""
However, in Concepcion, the Court concluded that the triggering
conditions of the Discover Bank rule imposed "no effective limit on its
application" and thus "set forth a state policy placing bilateral arbitration categorically off-limits for certain categories of consumer fraud
cases, upon the mere ex post demand by any consumer."" Therefore,
the Court in Concepcion held that such a "state-imposed policy preference 'interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus
creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.""' Accordingly, the
Supreme Court held the following:
because it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress . . ." a state policy that

allows any party to a consumer contract to demand classwide procedures ex post, in spite of her agreement to submit all disputes to

73. Id. at 1211 (citing Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746).
74. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
75. Cruz, 648 F.3d at 1211 (quoting Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746). The court noted
that "JuInder the so-called saving clause of FAA § 2, an arbitration agreement may be
invalidated by 'generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability."' Cruz, 648 F.3d at 1210 (quoting Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746).
76. 133 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).
77. Cruz, 648 F.3d at 1211 (quoting Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746).
78. Id. at 1211 (citing Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750).
79. Id. (quoting Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748). The Supreme Court further explained
that "conditioning the enforceability of arbitration agreements on the availability of
classwide arbitration procedures [was] inconsistent with the FAA" and that class
arbitration "eliminates the 'principal advantage of arbitration'-its informality-and instead
makes the process slower, more costly, more ensnared in procedural formality, and more
risky to defendants." Id. at 1212.
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bilateral arbitration, is preempted by the FAA, even if it may be
"desirable for [other] reasons[.]"8
Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the FAA preempted Califor-

nia's Discover Bank rule."
In Cruz, as in Concepcion, the plaintiffs argued that ATTM's class

action waiver was unenforceable because ATTM would be insulated from
liability under Florida law, thus defeating the remedial purpose of
FDUTPA and violating public policy.82 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed,
finding that the Supreme Court in Concepcion had specifically rejected
that public policy argument and found that states "cannot require a
procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for
unrelated reasons."" Accordingly, based on the Supreme Court's
holding in Concepcion, the Eleventh Circuit held the following:
[TIo the extent that Florida law would be sympathetic to the [pilaintiffs' arguments here, and would invalidate the class waiver simply
because the claims are of small value, the potential claims are
numerous, and many consumers might not know about or pursue their
potential claims absent class procedures, such a state policy stands as
an obstacle to the FAA's objective of enforcing arbitration agreements
according to their terms, and is preempted.'

Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's order
dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint and compelling arbitration of the
plaintiffs' claims.8
D. Whether a District Court has JurisdictionOver a Petition to
Compel Arbitration under § 4 of the FAA
In Community State Bank v. Strong (Strong II)," the Eleventh
Circuit reexamined its prior opinion in the same case, Community State

Bank v. Strong (Strong I),8 in light of the United States Supreme
Court's opinion in Vaden v. Discover Bank." The Eleventh Circuit held
that to determine whether a court has federal jurisdiction over a petition

to compel arbitration under § 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), the
court must "look through" the arbitration petition to the underlying
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 1212 (quoting Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750, 1753) (citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753).
Id. at 1212-13.
Id. at 1216.
651 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2011).
485 F.3d 597 (11th Cir. 2007).
556 U.S. 49 (2009).
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controversy and ask whether the underlying dispute between the parties
would have arisen under federal law." This case arose when James E.
Strong obtained a "payday loan"" from a store called Cash America
Pawn of Atlanta #15." Under the terms of Strong's loan, Community
State Bank was Strong's lender.9 2 Strong sued various defendants"
in Georgia state court alleging that his "payday loan" was illegal and
usurious under Georgia law. 4 Strong did not sue Community State
Bank in the state court action."
The defendants in the state court action removed the case to the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. 96 On
the same day, the state court defendants and the bank filed a petition
to compel arbitration under § 4 of the FAA, which commenced an
independent action. Strong moved to dismiss the petition to compel
arbitration, and the district court granted the motion, rejecting the
petitioners' arguments that federal law completely preempted Strong's
usury claims under Georgia law."
The petitioners appealed the dismissal of the petition to compel
arbitration, and on April 27, 2007, the Eleventh Circuit issued its Strong
I opinion reversing the dismissal and holding that, "looking through the
§ 4 arbitration petition to the underlying controversy, it was apparent
that Strong could have filed a coercive action arising under federal law,
and therefore the district court had federal jurisdiction over the petition

89. Strong II, 651 F.3d at 1254-55 (quoting Vaden, 556 U.S. at 65).
90. Id. at 1248. "Payday loans are generally small-dollar, short-term, high interest
loans secured by a check given to the payday lender in the amount of the cash advance
plus interest." Id. (quoting Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1221 n.9 (11th Cir.
2007)).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Strong sued Georgia Cash America, Inc., Cash America International, Inc., and
Daniel Feehan (Cash America defendants), the CEO of both companies who ran the Cash
America Pawn store that provided the payday loan to Strong. Id. at 1249.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1250. In the state court action, Strong expressly stated that he (1) was "not
assertting] any claims under the laws of the United States"; (2) "did not assert any claim
against a state or nationally chartered bank"; and (3) "did not seek recovery ... in excess
of $75,000." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Eleventh Circuit recognized
Strong's failure to name the bank as a defendant in the state court action as "an obvious
effort to avoid federal jurisdiction." Id.
96. Id. Strong moved to remand the removed action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, and the district court granted the motion, remanding the action to state court.
Id. at 1250-51.
97. Id. at 1250-51. Specifically, the petitioners argued that Strong's claims were
preempted by § 27(a) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA). Strong II, 651 F.3d at
1250-51; FDIA, 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a) (2006).
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to compel arbitration."" After Strong petitioned for a rehearing en
banc, the Eleventh Circuit stayed the appeal pending the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Vaden." Once the Supreme Court ruled
in Vaden, the Eleventh Circuit remanded the case to the panel,'00
which then issued its opinion in Strong II.101
The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis in Strong I by recognizing
that the FAA is non-jurisdictional.10 2 Accordingly, the court reasoned
that "the parties must identify an independent basis for federal
The court then
jurisdiction over a petition to compel arbitration."'
summarized its opinion in Strong I, in which it held that despite
Strong's express disavowal of any federal claims, "Strong's potential,
non-asserted federal claims created federal question jurisdiction over the
FAA petition[,]" and that the district court had jurisdiction over the
entire action.104
Next, the Eleventh Circuit discussed Vaden in detail, recognizing that
it "raised substantially the same jurisdictional question" the court faced
in Strong I.1os The district court in Vaden ordered the parties to
arbitrate their claims, and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the order, adopting the "'look through' approach"
to determining jurisdiction over FAA § 4 petitions.' 06 The Fourth
Circuit held that federal lawo' completely preempted Vaden's counterclaims and that the "now-federalized counterclaims" provided sufficient
grounds for federal question jurisdiction.'o
The United States Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the Fourth
Circuit's "look through" approach, but a majority of five Justices reversed
the Fourth Circuit's application of the "look through" analysis, conclud-

98. Strong II, 651 F.3d at 1251 (citing Strong 1, 485 F.3d at 612).
99. Id.
100. Cmty. State Bank v. Strong, 565 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2009).
101. 651 F.3d at 1251.
102. Id. at 1252.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1252-54. In Vaden, a Discover Bank affiliate (Discover) sued a credit card
holder (Vaden) in state court to recover past-due charges. Id. at 1252-53. Vaden asserted
affirmative defenses and counterclaims, alleging that Discover's finance charges violated
state usury laws. Id. at 1253. Discover then commenced a separate § 4 petition in federal
district court, seeking to compel arbitration of the counterclaims. Id. Significantly, this
was the first time either party in Vaden had invoked the arbitration clause in the credit
card agreement. Id.
106. Id.
107. The Fourth Circuit found that § 27(a) of the FDIA preempted the counterclaims
asserted in Vaden. Id.
108. Id.
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ing that when the "parties' controversy had already been 'embodied' in
pending litigation, . . . federal jurisdiction over the subsequent FAA
petition must be assessed from the face of the preexisting complaint."'09 In Strong II, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that in Vaden,
the Supreme Court "did not, however, answer the question of how to
define the parties' controversy for purposes of determining jurisdiction
when no litigation between the parties precedes the filing of the FAA
petition."110
After reviewing Vaden, the Eleventh Circuit held that the "essential
holding" of Strong I survived, especially regarding the bank, because "no
preexisting litigation ha[d] yet defined the contours of the controversy
between Strong and the [blank[,l" and the [blank's FAA petition was
"freestanding.""' In light of Vaden, the court held that "where the
parties' controversy has not yet been embodied in preexisting litigation,
[a] district court entertaining a § 4 petition' must decide for itself what
'a suit' arising out of the allegedly arbitrable controversy would look
like.""' Thus, the district court "must examine the dimensions of the
'full-bodied controversy'[] between the parties, and determine whether
any hypothetical claims arising out of that controversy would support
federal jurisdiction.""'
Reasoning that the court must still "look through" the petition to
"something" when no preexisting litigation exists, the Eleventh Circuit
considered the substantive dispute between the parties. 14 The court
examined the bank's FAA petition, including the claims and exhibits
thereto, to determine the "full flavor" of the dispute."' Once the court
had "probed the factual basis of the underlying controversy between the
parties," it then explored "the potential lawsuits that could arise

109. Id. The four justices who dissented in Vaden disagreed with the majority about
the application of the "look through" test. Id. at 1253-54. Instead of focusing on looking
through to existing litigation, the dissent would have held that the district court should
focus "on the concrete dispute to be arbitrated and determine for itself whether a
hypothetical suit-whether pending or not-arising out of that controversy would arise under
federal law." Id. at 1254.
110. Id. at 1253.
111. Id. at 1254.
112. Id. at 1255 (punctuation and internal quotation marks omitted).
113. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Specifically, district courts
should only look to "potential claims between the parties that could be stated on the face
of a well-pleaded complaint," not "'lurk[ing]' federal questions that could only arise by way
of an actual or anticipated defense[.]" Id. at 1256.
114. Id. at 1255. "The [Supreme] Court was very clear that jurisdiction should be
predicated on the substantive dispute between the parties, not the arbitrability issue
actually to be decided by the district court." Id.
115. Id. at 1257.
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between the parties from" the underlying controversy. 116 In doing so,
the court recognized that it could only consider "well-pled, non-frivolous
potential suits" and that "[a]nticipated federal defenses are irrelevant."n' The Eleventh Circuit recognized at least one potential basis
for federal jurisdiction-a potential Federal Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations (RICO) claim against the bank.ns Because in
looking through the bank's FAA petition, the Eleventh Circuit identified
a potential coercive claim between Strong and the bank, which would
state a federal issue on its face, the court held that the district court had
federal question jurisdiction over the bank's FAA petition, and improperly dismissed the petition."11
II.

JURISDICTION

A. Whether the District Court Misapplied the Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
for Dismissal in the Court's Considerationof a Motion for Remand
When Analyzing Whether a Defendant Was FraudulentlyJoined
In Stillwell v. Allstate Insurance Co.,120 the Eleventh Circuit held
that the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia misapplied the Rule 12(b)(6)121 standard for dismissal in
considering and denying a motion for remand on the ground of fraudulent joinder.122 This action arose out of an insurance dispute.123 The
plaintiff, R. Michael Stillwell, a Georgia resident, filed a lawsuit in
Georgia state court against Allstate Insurance Company, an Illinois
corporation, and Anthony Edwards Insurance Agency, Inc. (Edwards), a

116. Id. at 1258.
117. Id. Well-pled, non-frivolous claims may still provide grounds for jurisdiction "even
if not in the end meritorious." Id. at 1259.
118. Id. at 1259.
119. Id. at 1261. Because the Cash America petitioners were named as defendants in
Strong's state-court lawsuit, the Eleventh Circuit found itself constrained by Vaden to "look
through" exclusively to Strong's state court complaint to determine whether federal
jurisdiction existed over Cash America's FAA petition. Id. The court did not pursue this
inquiry because a final judgment in the state-court action had preclusive effect and
required that Cash America's petition must be dismissed. Id.
120. 663 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2011).
121. FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6).
122. Stillwell, 663 F.3d at 1334-35.
123. Id. at 1331. The plaintiff, R. Michael Stillwell, purchased an Allstate Insurance
Company insurance policy from defendant Anthony Edwards Insurance Agency, Inc.
(Edwards) for property Stillwell owned in East Point, Georgia. In 2007, Stillwell's property
suffered fire damage and Stillwell filed a claim for the damage with Allstate, which
Allstate denied. Id. Allstate denied coverage under the insurance policy because it claimed
that the property did not qualify as a "dwelling." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Georgia corporation, claiming that Allstate breached its insurance
contract with Stillwell and acted in bad faith in denying Stillwell's claim
and that Edwards breached its fiduciary duty to Stillwell in failing to
procure appropriate insurance coverage for Stillwell.124 Allstate
removed the case to federal court on grounds of diversity jurisdiction.1 25
Stillwell filed a motion to remand, claiming the district court lacked
jurisdiction over the case because the parties were not diverse as
Stillwell and Edwards were both Georgia residents. The district court
denied Stillwell's motion after concluding that Stillwell fraudulently
joined Edwards to defeat diversity and dismissed Edwards from the
action. 2 e In reaching this conclusion, the district court found that
Stillwell could not make a case against Edwards. Stillwell appealed,
challenging the district court's denial of his motion to remand.127
In its analysis, the Eleventh Circuit explained that "[tlo establish
fraudulent joinder, 'the removing party has the burden of proving [by
clear and convincing evidence] that either: (1) there is no possibility the
plaintiff can establish a cause of action against the resident defendant;
or (2) the plaintiff has fraudulently pled jurisdictional facts to bring the
resident defendant into state court[,]"' recognizing that this burden is a
"heavy one."1 28 Stillwell argued, and the Eleventh Circuit agreed, that
the district court erred in applying an "unduly demanding" pleading
standard when determining whether Stillwell fraudulently joined
Edwards.' 2 9 The court noted that the appropriate standard to apply
in a fraudulent joinder analysis is a "lax one"-district courts cannot
weigh the merits of a plaintiff's claims "beyond determining whether it
is an arguable one under state law.""o Thus, "[ilf there is even a

124. Id. at 1331-32. Stillwell had filed a previous suit in Georgia state court against
Allstate relating to Allstate's denial of coverage for water damage to Stillwell's property.
Id. at 1331.
125. Id. at 1332.
126. Id. After the district court dismissed Edwards, the district court consolidated the
two removed cases involving Stillwell and Allstate. Id. Allstate moved for summary
judgment, and the district court granted Allstate's motion. Id. Stillwell's appeal, in
addition to challenging the district court's denial of the motion to remand, also challenged
the district court's award of summary judgment in both cases. Id. The Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the summary judgment grant for Allstate in the water damage case, but vacated
the summary judgment order in the fire damage case. Id. at 1336. The court remanded
the fire damage case to district court with instructions to send it back to Georgia state
court for the reasons discussed herein. Id.
127. Id. at 1332.
128. Id. (quoting Crowe v. Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997)).
129. Id. at 1332-33.
130. Id. at 1333 (quoting Crowe, 113 F.3d at 1538).

1350

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

possibility that a state court would find that the complaint states a
cause of action against any one of the resident defendants, the [district]
court must find that the joinder was proper and remand the
The Eleventh Circuit distinguished this standard from
case... ."'
the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss standard, recognizing that under the
joinder claim is 'a
former, "all that is required to defeat a fraudulent
32
possibility of stating a valid cause of action."1
In denying Stillwell's motion to remand, the district court found
Stillwell's allegations against Edwards were "conclusory and lacking in
factual specificity.""as However, the Eleventh Circuit noted that
"disregarding allegations as conclusory and requiring them to contain a
certain amount of factual matter sounds a lot like the [Rule] 12(b)(6)
The Eleventh
standard, not the fraudulent joinder standard.""'
Circuit then examined the pleading standard applicable in Georgia state
courts to determine whether a Georgia state court could find that
Stillwell stated a claim against Edwards.'
The Eleventh Circuit recognized that the "true test" under Georgia's
pleading standard "is whether the pleading gives fair notice and states
the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly, and not whether as an
abstract matter it states conclusions or facts."' The court then held
that the district court erred in concluding that Edwards was fraudulently joined and decided that the case must be remanded to state court
because "the allegations against Edwards state the elements of
[plaintiff's claims] and give Edwards fair notice that it is being sued for
failing to procure adequate insurance coverage for Stillwell," and "it is,
at the very least, possible that a Georgia state court would conclude that
Stillwell's allegations against Edwards satisfied" the Georgia pleading
standard.'

131. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Coker v. Amoco Oil Co., 709 F.2d 1433, 1440-41
(11th Cir. 1983)).
132. Id. (quoting Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir.
1998)). Under the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss standard, "a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.'" Stillwell, 663 F.3d at 1333 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009)).
133. Stillwell, 663 F.3d at 1334.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. (quoting Carley v. Lewis, 221 Ga. App. 540, 542, 472 S.E.2d 109, 110-11
(1996)).
137. Id. at 1334-35.
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B. Whether a District Court Has Jurisdictionto Reconsider a
Remand Order After the Case Has Been Remanded
In Bender v. Mazda Motor Corp.,as the Eleventh Circuit held that
a district court cannot reconsider a remand order after the case has been
remanded because the district court no longer has jurisdiction over the
action.' 9 Plaintiff Peggy Bender brought an action on behalf of a
decedent in Alabama state court against Mazda Motor Corporation,
Mazda Motor of America, Inc. (together, Mazda), Ford Motor Company,
Inc. (Ford), Jimmy Pugh, and J&G Auto Sales (J&G), arising out of
injuries caused by a defective airbag in Bender's Mazda Miata. 40 Ford
and Mazda removed the lawsuit to the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Alabama based on diversity jurisdiction. 41
Bender moved to remand the action, arguing the evidence was insufficient to establish that the amount-in-controversy exceeded $75,000,142
under the rule set forth by the Eleventh Circuit in Lowery v. Alabama
Power Co.'14
In response to Bender's motion to remand, Ford and Mazda argued the
evidence established that the amount-in-controversy was greater than
$75,000 based on the factual similarities between Bender and Roe v.
Michelin North America, Inc.,'" a case in which the district court
found that the evidence satisfied the amount-in-controversy and
diversity jurisdiction existed.145 Ford and Mazda asked the district
court to deny Bender's motion to remand, or alternatively, to stay its
ruling on the motion until the Eleventh Circuit issued an opinion in the

138. 657 F.3d 1200 (11th Cir. 2011).
139. Id. at 1204.
140. Id. at 1201.
141. Id. Specifically Ford and Mazda argued that J&G and Pugh were not proper
defendants, and that the amount-in-controversy exceeded $75,000. Id.
142. Id.
143. 483 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 2007). See John O'Shea Sullivan & Ashby L. Kent, Trial
Practiceand Procedure,Eleventh CircuitSurvey, 59 MERCER L. REv. 1267, 1274-83 (2008)
and Sullivan et al., supra note 1, at 1217-24 for discussions of Lowery.
144. 637 F. Supp. 2d 995 (M.D. Ala. 2009).
145. Bender, 657 F.3d at 1201. InRoe, the estate of a passenger killed in a car accident
sued the tire manufacturer in state court, seeking an unspecified amount of damages under
Alabama's wrongful death act. 637 F. Supp. 2d at 997. The defendant removed the case
based on diversity jurisdiction, and the plaintiff moved to remand, arguing that the
defendant failed to show that the $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement was satisfied.
Id. The district court denied the motion to remand, finding that the facts clearly
established that the amount-in-controversy requirement was met. Id. at 998. In Bender,
the plaintiff filed a motion to remand, and at the time Ford and Honda asked the court to
deny Bender's motion, the Roe appeal remained pending. Bender, 657 F.3d at 1201.
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Roe appeal.146 The district court denied the motion to stay and
remanded the case to state court, and six months later, the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the decision in Roe."
Ford and Mazda then filed a Rule 60(b)(6)1'4 motion to reconsider in
light of new precedent.'49 The district court denied the motion to
reconsider because the remand had divested the district court of
jurisdiction over the case.so Ford and Mazda appealed the denial,
relying on Ritter v. Smith,'5 ' a case that interprets the appropriate
application of Rule 60(b)(6) when the law is mistakenly applied.15' On

146. Bender, 657 F.3d at 1201. The Eleventh Circuit noted that Ford and Mazda were:
incorrect in their reliance on the effect of Roe in these circumstances. The Roe
case changed circuit precedent on cases brought based on the first paragraph of
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b); however, this case is based on the second paragraph of 28
U.S.C. § 1446(b), which deals with cases that are not removable from the initial
pleading, but become removable at a later date through "a copy of an amended
pleading, motion, order, or other paper."
Id. at 1204 n.2 (quoting Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc., 608 F.3d 744, 757 (11th Cir.
2010)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2006). For a discussion of Pretka, see Sullivan et al.,
supra note 1, at 1217-24.
147. Bender, 657 F.3d at 1201; see Roe v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 613 F.3d 1058 (11th
Cir. 2010).
148. FED. R. Cv. P. 60(b)(6). Part (b) of Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, entitled Relief from a Judgment or Order, provides that
[o]n motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation,
or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an
earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively
is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).
149. Bender, 657 F.3d at 1201.
150. Id.
151. 811 F.2d 1398 (11th Cir. 1987).
152. Bender, 657 F.3d at 1202.
[Ritter] setts] forth four factors to be considered in determining whether to vacate
an order or judgment: (1) has the judgment been executed or what is the
prospective effect of the original order; (2) has there been only minimal delay in
the filing of the Rule 60(b)(6) motion and what intrusion will it have upon the
case; (3) is there a close relationship between the case with the newly decided law
. .. and the present action; and (4) are there considerations of comity.
Id. (citingRitter, 811 F.2d at 1401-03).
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appeal, Bender argued that, pursuant to the Eleventh Circuit's decision
in Harrisv. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc.,15s the provisions
of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), 54 providing "[ain order remanding a case to the
State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or
otherwise[,]" trump the provisions of Rule 60(b)(6)."
In Harris,the plaintiff asserted several state law claims and one claim
6
pursuant to a federal act in its complaint filed in state court.15 The
defendants timely removed the case to federal court under federal
question jurisdiction.' 7 The plaintiff moved to remand the case, and
the district court, in determining whether the federal claim was
substantial enough to support pendant jurisdiction, found that the
federal claim was barred and dismissed the claim, remanding the
remaining state law claims to state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(c).s58 The defendants filed a motion to reconsider the remand
order, and the district court granted the motion, setting aside its remand
On appeal, the
order and reasserting jurisdiction over the case.'
Eleventh Circuit held that the district court was incorrect in reasserting
jurisdiction over the action once it had been remanded to state court,
reasoning that neither the court of appeals nor the district court had
jurisdiction to revisit the district court's initial order remanding the case
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).6 o

153. 951 F.2d 325 (11th Cir. 1992).
154. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2006).
155. Bender, 657 F.3d at 1203 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(d). Bender also argued that regardless of the Ritter test, the district court properly
denied the Rule 60(b)(6) motion because Ford and Mazda failed to prove fraudulent joinder
over J&G and Pugh and because Ford and Mazda's removal was not timely. Id. at 1202.
Because the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision based on Bender's first
argument, the court did not address her alternative theories. Bender, 657 F.3d at 1203.
156. 951 F.2d at 327. In Harris,the plaintiff asserted a claim under the Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985. Id. at 326.
157. Id. at 326.
158. Id. at 326-27; 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2006).
159. Harris,951 F.2d at 326. In Harris,the defendants moved for summary judgment,
and the district court granted their motion. Id. The plaintiff appealed the grant of
summary judgment. Id.
160. Id. at 330. In discussing its analysis of the Harrisdecision, the Eleventh Circuit,
in Bender, explained as follows:
In Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer,423 U.S. 336 (1976), the Supreme
Court clarified that § 1447(d) applies only to remand orders issued pursuant to
§ 1447(c), which deals with remands based on the district court's lack of subject
matter jurisdiction over the removed case. 423 U.S. at 346. Expanding on that
doctrine, the court in Harris adopted the position accepted by an overwhelming
majority of our sister circuits that, "Unquestionably, § 1447(d) not only forecloses
appellate review, but also bars reconsideration by the district court of its own
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Ford and Mazda argued that Harris was inapplicable to Bender for
three reasons. First, they argued that the motion to reconsider in Harris
The Eleventh Circuit discounted this
was not a Rule 60 motion.'
argument on two grounds: (1) while the legal basis for the Harrismotion
is not clear, "Rule 60(b)(6) contains a general catch-all provision for any
other reason that justifies relief[,]" and (2) the court in Harris "was
unconcerned with the nature of the motion to reconsider, but instead
focused on the direct language of § 1447(d) . . . ."' Next, Ford and
Mazda argued that their pending request for a stay in light of the Roe
appeal distinguished their case from Harris and "circumvent[ed] the
finality of the 'by appeal or otherwise' language."6 s However, the
Eleventh Circuit held that the "finality of § 1447(d) does not allow any
sort of loophole for any pending motions.1 6 4 Lastly, Ford and Mazda
argued that the remand order in the present case was legally erroneous,
unlike Harris.' In response, the Eleventh Circuit stated that this
was "irrelevant" and noted that "even if the district court erroneously
remanded the case to state court, § 1447(d) prohibits the district court
from reconsidering its remand order because the district court no longer
had jurisdiction over the case."' 6 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
the district court's denial of Ford and Mazda's Rule 60(b)(6) motion for
reconsideration, holding that Harrisapplied and the district court lacked
jurisdiction to reconsider its remand order.'
C. Whether Federal Courts Have JurisdictionOver A Suit Between
an Alien Corporationand an Individual Who Is a Dual Citizen
In Molinos Valle Del Cibao v. Lama,68 the Eleventh Circuit held, as
a matter of first impression, that aliens may sue individuals who are
dual United States citizens under alienage jurisdiction-dual citizenship
will not destroy diversity. 69 This case arises from a foreign currency
exchange agreement entered into between the plaintiff, Molinos Valle
Del Cibao (Molinos), a Dominican Republic corporation, and the
defendants, Oscar R. Lama (Oscar Sr.), Carlos Lama Seliman (Carlos),

remand order."
Bender, 657 F.3d at 1203 (quoting Harris,951 F.2d at 330) (citations omitted).
161. Bender, 657 F.3d at 1203.
162. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1204.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. 633 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2011).
169. Id. at 1341.
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and Oscar Lama Seliman (Oscar Jr.), who reside in Florida. Oscar Sr.
is a dual citizen of the United States and the Dominican Republic;
whereas, Carlos and Oscar Jr. are Dominican citizens working in the
United States on non-immigrant worker visas.'
Molinos brought suit in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida for violations of the foreign currency
exchange agreement.171 Molinos asserted that the district court had
diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).' 72 On the eve of trial,
the defendants challenged jurisdiction for the first time, filing a motion
to dismiss and arguing that the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction because all parties were aliens. The district court denied the
motion to dismiss, and the defendants appealed.17 s
The defendants put forth three arguments against the district court's
exercise of alienage jurisdiction. First, the defendants argued that Oscar
Sr. was an improper party under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) because he was
a dual citizen, or alternatively, because he was domiciled abroad. Next,
the defendants argued that the district court never had subject matter

170. Id. at 1335.
171. Id. at 1338. Under the foreign currency exchange agreement, Molinos agreed to
buy United States dollars in exchange for Dominican pesos from the defendants. Id. at
1336.
172. Id. at 1338, 1340 n.10; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006). Section 1332(a)
provides the following:
[tihe district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest
and costs, and is in between(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state
are additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and
citizens of a State or of different States.
For the purposes of this section, section 1335, and section 1441, an alien
admitted to the United States for permanent residence shall be deemed a citizen
of the State in which such alien is domiciled.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Molinos argued that jurisdiction was proper because he was a
Dominican citizen and the defendants were residents of Florida. Molinos, 633 F.3d at
1338.
173. Molinos, 633 F.3d at 1339. During oral arguments before the Eleventh Circuit and
in subsequent briefing, it became apparent that Carlos and Oscar Jr. were not citizens of
the United States. Id. at 1339-40. Their Dominican citizenship destroyed full diversity
under alienage jurisdiction because Molinos was also a Dominican citizen. Id. at 1340.
The Eleventh Circuit vacated judgment as it pertained to Carlos and Oscar Jr., and the
court was faced with the remaining issue of whether it and the district court had subject
matter jurisdiction over a suit between a Dominican corporation and a dual citizen of the
United States and the Dominican Republic. Id.
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jurisdiction over the action because Carlos and Oscar Jr., as Dominican
Republic citizens, destroyed alienage jurisdiction from the initiation of
Finally, the defendants argue that the court should
the case."
impute Dominican citizenship to Oscar Sr. because the "real actors" in
the case, although not parties to the action, were citizens of the
The Eleventh Circuit addressed each arguDominican Republic.'
ment in turn. 7 6
In its analysis of the defendants' first argument, the Eleventh Circuit
summarized alienage jurisdiction,177 and then addressed, as a matter
of first impression, "whether aliens may sue individuals who are dual
United States citizens under alienage jurisdiction." 78 Recognizing that
the courts of appeals in deciding this issue "have uniformly held that, for
diversity purposes, courts should consider only the United States
citizenship of individuals who are dual citizens"; the Eleventh Circuit
was "persuaded by the reasoning of these courts and therefore [held]
that an individual who is a dual citizen of the United States and another
nation is only a citizen of the United States for the purposes of diversity
jurisdiction under § 1332(a)."" 9 This holding meant that Oscar Sr.'s
dual citizenship posed no bar to the court's jurisdiction over him.'80
The court next turned to the "more difficult question," of whether it
was required to "dismiss the entire case and vacate the judgment for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction because neither Carlos nor Oscar Jr.
were proper parties."' Appellate courts have the power "to rescue an

174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177.
Alienage jurisdiction is a form of diversity jurisdiction under which federal courts
may hear cases between "citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign
state." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). Like the complete diversity rule in cases between
citizens of different states, alienage jurisdiction prohibits an alien from suing
another alien in federal court unless the suit includes Unites States citizens as
plaintiffs and defendants. It is the burden of the party seeking federal jurisdiction
to demonstrate that diversity exists by a preponderance of the evidence.
Molinos, 633 F.3d at 1340 (citations omitted).
178. Molinos, 633 F.3d at 1341.
179. Id.
180. Id. Oscar Sr. also argued that he was domiciled in the Dominican Republic and
not domiciled in, and thus not a citizen of, Florida. Id. The Eleventh Circuit recognized
that, "[i]f true, this assertion would defeat diversity jurisdiction; U.S. citizens domiciled
abroad are neither 'citizens of a State' under § 1332(a) nor 'citizens or subjects of a foreign
state' and therefore are not proper parties to a diversity action in federal court." Id.
However, the court was satisfied from the facts of record that Oscar Sr. was domiciled in
Florida. Id. at 1342.
181. Id. at 1343.
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otherwise valid judgment by dismissing non-diverse parties,"182 but
"only if no party will be prejudiced by the dismissal."" To determine
if the dismissal of Oscar Jr. and Carlos would prejudice another party,
the court relied on the two factors established under the Newman Green,
Inc. v. Larrain," framework: (1) "whether the non-diverse party is
indispensable under Rule 1 9 [,J""" and (2) "whether the presence of the
non-diverse party provided the other side with a tactical advantage in
the litigation."'8 6 Under the first Newman-Green factor, the court
assumed Carlos and Oscar Jr. were required parties, but held that Oscar
Sr. had not shown that they were indispensable under Rule 19(b).'
The court also found that the second Newman-Green factor favored
dismissal.'88 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit held that Oscar Sr. would not
face prejudice as the sole defendant in the action and dismissed Carlos
and Oscar Jr. pursuant to Rule 21.189
Next, the court examined Oscar Sr.'s final argument against jurisdiction-that the court should impute Dominican citizenship to Oscar Sr.
because the real actors in the case, although not parties to the action,

182. Id.; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 21. Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that "[mlisjoinder of parties is not a ground for dismissing an action. On motion
or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party. The court may
also sever any claim against any party."
183. Molinos, 633 F.3d at 1343. The Supreme Court has cautioned appellate courts to
use Rule 21 sparingly. However, the Eleventh Circuit also recognized the somewhat
contradictory policy laid out by the United States Supreme Court regarding Fed. R. Civ.
P. 21-the Supreme Court has stated that "[o]nce a diversity case has been tried in federal
court, . . . considerations of finality, efficiency, and economy become overwhelming."
Molinos, 633 F.3d at 1343. In light of this, the Eleventh Circuit noted that it was
"[kleeping in mind that this case has already been to a jury trial" when conducting its
analysis under Rule 21. Id.
184. 490 U.S. 826 (1989). In Newman Green, the United States Supreme Court set
forth the framework for establishing that a party will be prejudiced by dismissing nondiverse parties. Id. at 828.
185. FED. R. CIv. P. 19.
186. Molinos, 633 F.3d at 1343-44.
187. Id. at 1344. In its analysis, the court noted that Rule 19 is a two-step inquiry: (1)
whether the parties are "required" parties, and (2) if the parties are required, but cannot
be joined, whether in equity and good conscience, the action should proceed among the
existing parties or should be dismissed. Id.; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 19. The Eleventh
Circuit looked at all the factors under Rule 19, but found they weighed against dismissal.
Molinos, 633 F.3d at 1344.
188. Molinos, 633 F.3d at 1344-45. "Tactical advantages include access to otherwise
unavailable discovery materials only because of the presence of the improper party." Id.
at 1345. The court found that no such "otherwise unavailable discovery" was at issue in
Lamas and also recognized that "even if Oscar Sr. did suffer a tactical disadvantage, he
had the power to remedy that issue" by challenging jurisdiction earlier in the action. Id.
189. Id. at 1345.
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were citizens of the Dominican Republic. 9 o However, the court
determined that this argument also failed,"9 1 concluding that the
district court had alienage jurisdiction over Oscar Sr. and that the
Eleventh Circuit could properly hear arguments on the merits of Oscar
Sr.'s remaining claims of error on appeal. 2

190. Id. at 1345-46. Oscar Sr. alternatively argued that the real actors are
indispensable parties under Rule 19. Id. However, the court rejected this argument as
well because Oscar Sr. failed to put forth any reason why he or the absent parties would
be prejudiced if the real actors were not parties to the case. Id. at 1346-47.
191. Id. at 1347. Oscar Sr. supported his imputation argument by comparing the facts
at issue to a case involving corporate law, Freeman v. NorthwestAcceptance Corp., 754 F.2d
553 (5th Cir. 1985), wherein the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
imputed a subsidiary's citizenship to the parent corporation and, in doing so, destroyed
complete diversity. Molinos, 633 F.3d at 1346. The Eleventh Circuit held that Freeman's
logic is "inapposite when applied to individuals," recognizing numerous distinctions
between corporations and individuals relating to citizenship and rejecting Oscar Sr.'s
imputation argument. Id. at 1346-47. The court reasoned that corporations are "citizens"
in a diversity analysis wherever they are incorporated and where they have their principal
place of business, and thus corporations may be citizens of multiple states. Id. at 1346.
Additionally, corporations can merge and re-form themselves "wherever and in as many
states as they please," but individuals are only citizens of the states in which they are
domiciled and have only one domicile-individuals "cannot choose to split their identities
and 'incorporate' in a second state." Id.
192. Molinos, 633 F.3d at 1347.

